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Abstract
Can job assignment based on comparative advantage and learning about workers’ ability explain wage
and promotion dynamics within firms? In order to answer this question the Gibbons and Waldman
(1999b) model is estimated in a Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) framework using a unique
data set on white collar workers in Norway for the years 1987-1997. The estimation is carried out on
two different occupational groups: technical and administrative white collar workers. The selection of
workers into a given position within a firm hierarchy is based on comparative advantage. Both
measurable and unmeasurable skills are important. This holds in both occupations studied. When it
comes to firms’ learning about their workers the results are not so clear. But overall the results on
learning seem to have stronger support than what previous studies have found. In general, there is more
evidence for learning about administrative white collar workers than about technical white collar
workers.
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1  Introduction
The literature on internal labor markets suggests that internal mobility of workers is important. The
theory assumes that workers are hired at lower levels in the firm hierarchy (ports of entry) and
promoted into higher positions. This internal mobility is an important part of a firm’s personnel policy
and serves two purposes. The first is to make an efficient assignment of workers to jobs. The second is
to provide incentives. One way of creating incentives is to promote workers. Since internal mobility
has consequences for both the individual worker and the firm, it is important to understand the
underlying mechanisms. More specifically, the question asked in this paper is: Can job assignment
based on workers’ comparative advantage and firms learning about workers’ ability explain wage and
promotion dynamics within firms?
This paper contributes to a very small empirical literature on wage and promotion dynamics
within firms using the Gibbons and Waldman (1999b) model (GW99) as a theoretical framework.
Methodologically, I follow Lluis (2005), but extend on her paper along two dimensions. First, as
pointed out by Osterman (1982), firms may consist of “several often quite different internal labor
markets.” Therefore I analyze two large and important occupational groups separately; technical white
collar workers and administrative white collar workers. Second, Lluis (2005) has a relatively small
survey from Germany, while I have a large administrative data set. My data cover a population of
white collar workers within firms and changes in rank are reported by employers, not by the workers
themselves. Also, the institutional setting in Norway is more suitable for studying learning than in
Germany. Lluis speculates that her poor fit of the model with learning is due to the apprenticeship
system affecting her data.
My results suggest the following: Selection of workers into a given position within a firm
hierarchy is based on comparative advantage. Both measurable and unmeasurable skills are important.
This holds in both occupations studied. When it comes to firms learning about their workers’ abilities
the results are not so clear. In general, there is more evidence for learning about administrative than for
technical white collar workers. Overall, and in contrast to what Lluis finds in the German data, the
results on learning seem to have support in the Norwegian data.
The paper unfolds as follows. Sections 2and 3 discuss relevant literature and present an
overview of GW99. Sections 4 and 5 present the data and some descriptive analysis. Section 6
describes the empirical setup along with a discussion of several methodological challenges. Section 7
discuss the estimation results and Section 8 summarizes and concludes the paper.
2  Background
Empirical findings by Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom (1994a) (BGH) have inspired much theoretical
work including Gibbons and Waldman (1999b).1 Gibbons and Waldman build an integrative model
incorporating job assignment, on-the-job human-capital acquisition, and learning.2 Comparative
advantage implies that workers’ skills are rewarded differently at different hierarchical levels and
1Gibbons and Waldman (1999a) present a survey of careers within organizations. See also Gibbons (1998,
1997) and Baker, Jensen, and Murphy (1988). See Lazear and Rosen (1981) for a specific theory of incentives
and mobility; the tournament theory.
2In Gibbons and Waldman (2006) they enrich their 1999–model by including schooling and “task-
specific” human capital. The latter extension produces cohort effects.
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workers are sorted by their skills and abilities into a given position in the hierarchy.3 Firms learn about
the workers’ innate abilities over time. In the Gibbons and Waldman model there is symmetric learning
about workers’ abilities, implying that any new information about the workers’ abilities is publicly
known to all firms. The GW99 model explains five important findings in BGH. (1) real-wage decreases
are not rare, but demotions are. (2) Wage increases are serially correlated. (3) Promotions are
associated with large wage increases. (4) Wage increases on promotion are small relative to the
difference between average wages across levels of the job ladder. (5) Workers who receive large wage
increases early in their stay at one level of the job ladder are promoted quickly to the next. Gibbons and
Waldman derive their model both without and with learning. In general, the learning case gives better
predictions. See Table 1.
Three previous papers use the GW99 model to study dynamics of wages and careers within
firms. They all differ in terms of methodology applied. Lima and Pereira (2003) use Portuguese data
for the years 1991–1995. The authors modify the GW99 model somewhat to fit it into a fixed effect
panel data estimation framework. They assume full information about workers’ innate abilities at all
times and, as opposed to the comparative advantage hypothesis, that ability is rewarded the same at
each hierarchical level. Given their simplifying assumptions they find “a stronger employer learning
and/or human capital accumulation effect at the bottom of the hierarchy and a stronger job assignment
effect at the top.”
Dias da Silva and van der Klaauw (2006) also use Portuguese data. The years covered are 1991
to 2000. In contrast to the previous study they are more explicit in testing the predictions of the GW99
model within a dynamic panel setting.4 Dias da Silva and van der Klaauw find significant positive
serial correlation in wage increases and promotion rates, from which the authors conclude that
employer learning about the worker’s ability might be important. In their analysis they also conclude
that the Portuguese labor market is not competitive. After discussing different definitions of promotion
they “argue that employer–reported promotions relate to a large extent to wage increases rather than
changes in job tasks and complexity.”5 6
The third paper, which stands out from the other two with respect to methodology, is Lluis
(2005) using German survey data for the years 1985–1996. In contrast to the two papers discussed
above, she looks for whether one can find evidence of comparative advantage and learning in her data,
i.e. she investigates the underlying theoretical building blocks in the GW99 model. The estimation is
performed within a Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) framework. She finds that both measured
and unmeasured ability is important in the rank assignment, with unmeasured ability being most
important at higher levels. However, it is hard to find evidence of learning in her data set. She
attributes this to the German apprenticeship system where firms and workers have the opportunity to
3Formally, comparative advantage can be defined as follows (Sattinger, 1993). Define ija  as the number
of times that worker i can perform job j’s task per period. Worker 1 has a comparative advantage at job 1 and
worker 2 has a comparative advantage at job 2 if 11 21 12 22/ /a a a a> .
4See also Belzil and Bognanno (2005) for a similar (dynamic) approach but without the Gibbons-Waldman
model as the theoretical framework.
5Matthews (1986) writes: “[Promotion] is so familiar that it is easy to overlook just how complicated it is.
Typically is has all the following features. There is a system of ranks; responsibilities go with rank; so does pay
and usually pension, so that rank maximisation becomes the proxy for income maximisation; promotion takes
place only by one step at a time; there is property in rank, in the sense that demotion occurs seldom or never, poor
performance being penalised instead by lack of future promotion or in extreme cases dismissal; there is
retirement age, after which responsibilities fall at a stroke from a lifetime high to zero.”
6Promotions can also be seen as pay for performance: “Promotions appear to be the most important form
of pay for performance in most organizations, especially in hierarchical, white-collar firms" (Gibbs, 1996).
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learn about the quality of the match before workers finish formal education and start the job search.
One implication of this is reduced need for job mobility to learn about workers’ abilities. This is
supported by the low mobility figures she observes in the German data.
The findings in the BGH study, the empirical foundation for GW99, were based on evidence
from one US firm only. However, labor market institutions differ between countries. This makes it
interesting to estimate the model on data for different countries in order to facilitate comparative
analysis, and assess whether the model is as general as intended. In particular it is interesting to see
whether it is possible to find evidence of learning since Lluis did not find very compelling evidence for
this.
I use data of white collar workers in Norway for the years 1987–1997. The data is collected by
the main employers’ organization in Norway, and as such it differs from the German data which is
based on surveys among individuals. The data is collected for wage negotiation purposes and is of high
quality. One of its unique features is that it contains information about the workers’ ranks. Another
important feature is that I have exact information on changes in the workers’ positions due to detailed
hierarchical codes recorded by the employers. In the German survey data the workers themselves
report changes in their positions. Given the sample size, it is possible to estimate the model for two
different occupations. The first is technical white collar workers, 202,142 observations. The second is
administrative white collar workers, 227,077 observations. This makes it possible to compare two
different occupational groups and see whether the parameters of the model differ between occupations.
When estimating the GW99 model one needs a one period lag in the no-learning case and a two period
lag in the learning case. Lluis in her paper maximizes the sample size depending on which version of
the model she estimates. Given my large sample, I can afford to keep the same sample size in both the
no-learning and learning case. In this way the results in the two model versions are not affected by
changes in the sample.
3  Gibbons and Waldman (1999): An Integrative Model
There are two versions of the model, one with full information and one with symmetric learning.
Full information
In the model with full information, job assignment and human-capital acquisition drive the dynamics in
the model.
The economy consists of identical firms. There is free entry into production, labor is the only
input factor in production, and the firms and workers are risk-neutral and have a discount rate of zero.
Worker i’s career lasts for T periods. Let iq  denote i’s innate ability, and assume that iq  is common
knowledge at the beginning of the worker’s career. { , }i H Lq q qÎ  where H is high and L is low. Worker
i’s effective ability at time t (t=1,…,T) is given by
( ) ( 0 and 0)it i it x xxf x f fh q= > £ (1)
where )(·f  is some function of i’s labor-market experience itx  prior to time t.
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Firms have J hierarchical levels (jobs).7 Worker i produces
( )ijt j j it ijty d c  = + + (2)
if he is assigned to level j in period t. jd  and jc  are (technological) constants, with
1 10 J Jd d d-< < ¼ <<  and 1 1 0J Jc cc -> > ¼ > > , and ijte  is a noise term/productivity shock with
characteristics 2(0, )N  .
Define jh  as the solution to
1 1
j j
j j j jd c d ch h+ ++ = + (3)
that is, jh is the level of effective ability that makes a worker equally productive at level j as at level
j+1. The worker is assigned to job j if jith h< . If 
j
ith h= , then worker i is assigned to level j+1.
Since the production equation (3) is linear, the model is easy to depict graphically, see Figure 1
where J=3.
  
Figure 1: Worker assignment with J=3. Equilibrium job assignment is along the bold line.
7Gibbons and Waldman (1999b) use 3 hierarchical levels. Gibbons and Waldman (2006) use 2 since the
model’s main conclusion is not sensitive to the number of levels.
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An effective job assignment is along the bold line. If 
1
ijth h< a worker is assigned to level 1, if
1 2
ijth h h< <  he is assigned to level 2, and if 
2
ijth h>  he is assigned to level 3. We note that as we
move up in the hierarchy the worker’s output is more sensitive to effective ability. The jc  parameter is
monotonically increasing with the levels.8
Because of competition among the firms wages w are equal to expected output
( ).ijt ijt j j i j j it itw Ey d c d c f xh q= = + = + (4)
Note that since ith  increases monotonically with labor market experience demotions cannot
occur.
Symmetric learning
 In this version of the model, firms are uncertain about the worker’s innate ability iq . Let 0p  be the
firm’s initial belief that a worker’s innate ability is Hq  at the beginning of the worker’s career and
0(1 )p-  that the worker’s innate ability is .Lq  Learning occurs only gradually because of the stochastic
element ijte  in the production function. A signal about worker’s effective ability is given by
.ijt jit it ijt
j
y d
z
c
h e
-
= = + (5)
The expected innate ability of worker i in period t is denoted by eith  and is given by
1( | , , )
e
it i it x itE z zq q - -= ¼ (6)
and the effective ability is now
( ).e eit it itf xh q= (7)
The worker’s wage becomes
( ).e eijt ijt j j it j j it itw Ey d c d c f xh q= = + = + (8)
8This is in line with e.g. Leonard (1990) who writes: “Position in the corporate hierarchy is one of the
strongest determinants of pay. In a number of economic models, this link is attributed to the greater sensitivity of
corporate success to the acts of higher-level executives than to those of lower-level executives. Executives with a
wider span of control are expected to have greater marginal revenue products.”
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As stated in the Introduction, the Gibbons and Waldman model sets out to explain five facts
from the BGH study. Table 1 summarizes whether the two model versions are able to generate the
predictions.
 Table 1: Summing up the predictions of the GW99 model. FI = Full information. SL = symmetric
learning
Prediction FI SL
1. Real wage decreases are not rare, but demotions are. No Yes
2. Wages are serially correlated. Yes Yes
3. Promotions are associated with large wage increases. “weak form” Yes
4. Wage increases on promotion are small relative to the difference between
average wages across levels of the job ladder.
Yes Yes
5. Workers who receive large wage increases early in their stay at one level
of the job ladder are promoted quickly to the next.
Yes Yes
4  Data description
I use data from the Confederation of Norwegian Enterprise (NHO). This is the main employers’
organization in Norway. NHO has about 16,000 member companies. 73% of these companies have
records for fewer than 20 person-years. The member companies employ about 450,000 workers,
mainly in construction, services and manufacturing in Norway.9 There is a bias towards manufacturing.
Many of the member companies in NHO operate in export and import competing industries. The total
labor force in Norway is about 2.3 million workers, of whom about half were employed in the public
sector in the year 2000, hence the NHO cover roughly 40% of private sector employment. The
members of NHO also produced about 40% of private sector GDP.
The data is based on establishment records for all white-collar workers employed by firms that
are members of the NHO confederation. The data quality is high as the wage data were a major source
of information for the collective wage bargaining process in Norway between the NHO and the unions.
The data cover on average 97,000 white-collar workers per year in different industries (although biased
towards manufacturing) during the years 1980-1997.10 CEOs (and in large firms, vice CEO) are not
included. The average number of plants is 5,000 and the average number of firms is 2,700 per year. To
obtain more information we have merged the NHO with the main administrative matched employer-
employee data base assembled by Statistics Norway. This database has a rich set of information on
workers and plants for the period 1986-2002. One of the reasons for merging the NHO data set with the
administrative register, besides obtaining more information, is that it is unclear whether the information
reported in the NHO statistics pertains to plants, firms or a combination of the two. For more detailed
information about the NHO data and the merging process, see Hunnes, Møen, and Salvanes (2007).
Because of the merging with the administrative data set, I restrict the years used in this paper to
1987-1997.11
9NHO (2004)
10The year 1987 is missing. However, the data set for each year contains lagged values; hence, I was able
to reconstruct 1987 by using lagged values in the 1988 file. This is of course not a perfect reconstruction, since I
do not have information on workers who left the data set in 1987 and were not present in the 1988 file.
11For each observation I need two years of lagged values. This implies that I also use information from
both the 1986 and 1985 files. See Section 6 for more information.
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A great advantage of our data set is that it has information about occupations and hierarchical
levels. Each worker is assigned an occupational group and a level within the occupational group. The
groups are labeled A-F: Group A is technical white collar workers; Group B is foremen; Group C is
administration; Group D is shops and Group E is storage. Group F is a miscellaneous group consisting
of workers that do not fit in any of the other categories. Hierarchical level is given by a number where
zero represents the top level. The number of levels varies by group and ranges from 1 (F) to 7 (A).12
These codes are made by NHO for wage bargaining purposes, and as such, they are similar across
plants and industries.
In this paper I restrict the sample to look at group A (technical white collar workers) and group
C (administrative white collar workers) only. About 35% of the workers belong to group A and about
40% belong to group C. In the estimations I run separate regressions. This implies that I do not have to
create a single hierarchy within the firm across different occupations. Such a harmonization is not
straightforward.13 Further, by analyzing the two occupations separately the estimation of the rank
coefficients will not be influenced by workers who switch ranks because they switch occupation. Some
workers switch occupations e.g. from technical jobs to administrative jobs.
The wage variable is monthly wage on September 1st including the value of fringe benefits and
excluding overtime and bonuses. Indirect costs to the plant such as payroll tax, pensions etc are not
included. I transform nominal wages to real wages using the Consumer Price Index with base year
1997.
In creating the sample I apply the following: (1) Monthly wage should be at least NOK 2,000
measured in 1980 kroner (to remove outliers) and I look at only full time workers (over the age of 16),
i.e. numbers of hours worked per week should be at least 30. (2) Observations where one or several of
the variables are missing are dropped from the sample. (3) Labor market experience is potential labor
market experience. (4) Since the instruments matrices will be dominated by columns with zeros and
ones, I restrict the moves up or down along the career path to 2 levels between each time period. In a
small number of cases I do observe workers who move between one of the two lowest levels and the
highest level. For group A, I have in addition aggregated the two highest levels into one and the two
lowest levels into one.14 15
5  Descriptive analysis
I start this section by presenting summary statistics by hierarchical level in Table 2.16 As expected,
average wage increases along the hierarchy with the wage at the top level being about twice the wage
at the lowest level for technical workers. For administrative workers the ratio is about 2.8. At the three
lowest levels the wages for technical workers are larger than for administrative workers, but on the two
highest levels the average wages for administrative workers are larger than for technical workers. This
is especially true for the highest level where administrative workers earn 17.5% more than technical
workers. The same pattern holds more or less for wage increases as well. The ratio between top/bottom
12Note that not all firms will have workers on each of the seven levels.
13One problem lies in the fact that some levels overlap with respect to responsibility in the organization.
For more on this, see Hunnes, Møen, and Salvanes (2007) using the data where a single hierarchy within the firm
is created.
14By doing this, I reduce the instrument matrix Z from 49 possible instruments (i.e. interaction terms) to
25. I also drop columns in the instrument matrix which only contains zeros. See Section 6.
15Group C has by definition 5 hierarchical levels. To make the estimation results for the two occupational
groups comparable I choose to keep all 5 ranks in the administrative group.
16In the descriptive analysis I treat all the firms as one big firm, i.e. I do not take into account firm
heterogeneity.
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in the two groups is now 2.6 and 3.6 implying that there is larger inequality in wage increases for
administrative workers.
In general, the average age for administrative workers is a bit higher than for technical
workers, except for the lowest level. And the age increases with the hierarchical levels. For both groups
years of education increase with the rank. Overall, technical workers have one more year of schooling
compared to administrative workers. Workers on the highest level have about a 4-5 year longer
education than the workers at the lowest level.
Turning to experience, we see from the table that even if experience increases with rank, there
is, on average, no large difference between top and bottom ranks for technical workers. For
administrative workers, on the other hand, there is about 4 years difference in experience between top
and bottom in the firm hierarchy. In general, administrative workers have more experience than
technical workers. But this is not surprising since technical workers, in general, have more education.
On the two lowest levels, females are in the majority among administrative workers. But the
female share decreases with rank, for both of the two groups. This is especially noticeable for
administrative workers. Even if the female share is 88% at the lowest level it is only 3% at the top
level. It is clear that very few women make it past middle management (level 3).
The skill index increases with the levels, and on average it is higher for administrative workers
than for technical workers.17
17See Section 6.1 for a definition of the skill index.
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 Table 2: Summary statistics (means) by level. Standard deviation in parenthesis.
Technical white collar workers (N=202,142)
Level Wage  wage Age Education Experience Female Skills
1 18,362 218 42.2 10.9 23.3 .23 -.27
(2,463) (889) (11.2) (1.9) (12.1) (.42) (.24)
2 21,385 379 40.7 12.6 20.1 .12 -.13
(3,069) (1,098) (10.7) (2.3) (11.9) (.33) (.25)
3 25,936 426 43.0 13.8 21.1 .07 .09
(4,210) (1,365) (9.7) (2.4) (10.8) (.25) (.30)
4 31,181 480 45.4 14.5 22.9 .05 .25
(4,415) (1,655) (9.1) (2.5) (10.1) (.22) (.33)
5 38,066 569 47.9 15.6 24.2 .03 .48
(5,833) (1,970) (8.0) (2.3) (8.6) (.16) (.35)
Administrative white collar workers (N=227,077)
Level Wage  wage Age Education Experience Female Skills
1 15,579 243 39.8 10.6 21.2 .88 -.19
(2,066) (852) (11.8) (1.5) (12.6) (.32) (.22)
2 18,084 262 42.2 11.0 23.2 .68 -.07
(2,476) (919) (10.7) (1.7) (11.4) (.47) (.23)
3 23,786 409 43.9 12.0 23.9 .30 .09
(4,213) (1,343) (10.0) (2.2) (11.0) (.46) (.27)
4 31,867 543 46.1 13.3 24.8 .09 .32
(6,159) (1,805) (8.7) (2.43) (9.6) (.29) (.35)
5 44,741 872 48.2 14.8 25.4 .03 .59
(8,925) (3,205) (8.0) (2.3) (8.5) (.16) (.37)
Monthly real wage in 1997 kroner. Education in years of schooling. Experience is potential experience, that is, age minus
years of schooling minus 7. Skills are given by the skill index, see Section 6.1.
Figure 2 shows that mean wage increases along the career path. For both groups the following
is true: (1) There is large wage variation within a given level, and the standard deviation increases with
the ranks. In other words, wage inequality within a given level increases along the career path. (2)
There is considerable overlap between the wage intervals in the different hierarchical levels, which is
in line with previous findings, see e.g. Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom (1994a). The figure also reveals
that the (level, wage)–curve is more convex for administrative than for technical workers. This implies
that administrative workers are faced with more wage inequality between the ranks than technical
workers. Also notice that both the average wage and its standard deviation are much larger for
administrative workers at the two top levels.
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Figure 2: Average monthly real wage by hierarchical level.
The rest of the descriptive analysis is organized around the five predictions that the Gibbons
and Waldman (1999b)–model generates. By looking for evidence of the predictions in the sample, one
can get a sense of whether the data will support the GW99 model or not.
Are real wage decreases rare? 
Real wage decreases are not rare as documented by Table 3. The fraction of workers who received a
real wage decrease differed from as few as 6–9% in 1996 to as many as 76–80% in 1988, a recession
year. One interesting observation is that during the late 80s the higher levels are more affected by real
wage decreases than the lower levels. The fraction of workers who experienced a real wage decrease
more or less increases with the hierarchy. This was a period with increasing unemployment and a
downturn in the Norwegian economy. From 1991 and onwards it seems as if the top levels are those
least affected by real wage decreases, at least for technical workers. Comparing the means for the two
occupational groups, it seems as if there is a larger fraction of administrative workers experiencing real
wage decreases. The bottom line is that real wage decreases are not rare.
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Table 3: Fraction of workers who had a real wage decrease from t1 to t by hierarchical level.
Technical white collar workers (N=202,142)
Year Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Level 5 mean
1987 .73 .69 .71 .77 .82 .75
1988 .80 .76 .79 .82 .82 .80
1989 .53 .62 .64 .70 .71 .64
1990 .20 .27 .27 .23 .23 .24
1991 .31 .29 .29 .29 .22 .28
1992 .42 .34 .35 .35 .30 .35
1993 .43 .35 .33 .35 .32 .36
1994 .16 .15 .17 .17 .17 .16
1995 .20 .22 .26 .22 .21 .22
1996 .07 .06 .06 .05 .04 .06
1997 .16 .14 .13 .12 .10 .13
Administrative white collar workers (N=227,077)
Year Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Level 5 mean
1987 .59 .69 .65 .65 .67 .65
1988 .73 .76 .79 .75 .76 .76
1989 .48 .58 .72 .77 .82 .67
1990 .19 .24 .29 .30 .33 .27
1991 .27 .28 .34 .31 .28 .30
1992 .40 .39 .41 .42 .43 .41
1993 .46 .39 .41 .42 .40 .42
1994 .18 .18 .18 .18 .17 .18
1995 .23 .26 .27 .24 .28 .26
1996 .09 .08 .09 .10 .09 .09
1997 .23 .25 .19 .16 .22 .21
Are demotions rare? 
In Table 4 I show all the within firm mobility during the years studied.18 The diagonal elements show
the percentage of the workers who in a given level stay at that level. I define a promotion as a change
from one level to a higher level.19 The percentage promoted is given above the diagonal while the
percentage of workers who got a demotion is given below the diagonal. Overall, I observe a mobility
rate, i.e. change in ranks, of 9.21% (technical workers) and 8.83% (administrative workers). If we split
these two numbers into demotion/promotion, we get 2.51/6.70% and 3.52/5.31%. In other words, there
is a higher mobility rate for technical workers and they have a higher promotion and a lower demotion
rate as compared to administrative workers. Looking at Table 4, we see that the demotion rate from a
given level is about 2–4% for technical workers and about 3–8% for administrative workers. These
numbers are not very different from those found in previous studies. Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom
(1994a) find that demotions and lateral transfers are rare. Seltzer and Merrett (2000) find that 6.96% of
the transitions were promotions and 3.33% were demotions (“demotion was just an ordinary part of job
rotation”). Dohmen, Kriechel, and Pfann (2004) find an annual promotion rate of 5.6% and demotion
rate of 1.6%. Lazear (1999) find a great deal of downward mobility. McCue (1996) find that of the
18Note that the last row for each group gives the distribution of the workers on the different ranks.
19See Dias da Silva and van der Klaauw (2006) for a nice (but short) overview of different definitions of
promotions that are being used in empirical literature.
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20% who are mobile in her data, almost half move within the firm, and about half of these are
considered promotions. In the study by Pergamit and Veum (1999), 24% of the workers reported a
promotion at their firm the previous year, but many of the promotions did not involve any change in
duties or position. Grund (2005) study a firm with plants in two different countries and finds a
promotion rate of 1.2% in the German plant and 8.4% in the US plant. Belzil and Bognanno (2005)
find that promotions are slightly more frequent than demotions making the authors conclude (p. 10) “It
is evident [...] that, contrary to conventional wisdom, demotions are frequent enough to merit
attention.”
Table 4: Within firm mobility. The diagonal elements show the percentage of the workers who in a
given level stay at that level. Promotions (demotions) are given above (below) the diagonal.
Technical white collar workers (N=202,142)
Level
Lag level 1 2 3 4 5 Total
1 91.49% 7.40 1.10 .00 .00 100.00
2 2.04 87.23 10.16 .57 .00 100.00
3 .15 2.30 91.66 5.50 .39 100.00
4 .00 .21 3.96 89.73 6.10 100.00
5 .00 .00 .50 3.61 95.89 100.00
Total 14.00 20.24 34.67 19.54 11.56 100.00
Administrative white collar workers (N=227,077)
Level
Lag level 1 2 3 4 5 Total
1 87.34% 11.97 .68 .00 .00 100.00
2 3.05 92.19 4.59 .17 .00 100.00
3 .13 4.62 90.67 4.53 .04 100.00
4 .00 .19 5.04 93.07 1.69 100.00
5 .00 .00 .18 7.60 92.22 100.00
Total 14.95 38.04 27.04 17.46 2.51 100.00
Are wage increases serially correlated? 
One of the findings in Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom (1994a,b) was positive serial correlation in
wage increases even after controlling for observable characteristics. To study this question, I restrict
my observations to a balanced panel over 11 years and follow 3,798 technical and 4,601 administrative
workers over the years 1987–1997. The correlations in residual percentage real wage increase are given
in Table 5. The controls in the OLS are education, gender, age, hierarchical level, sector and year
dummies. For both occupations, there is, with three exceptions, statistical significant negative
correlation between increase in year t and increase in year t1. In many cases there is also statistical
significant correlation beyond last year. If we look at technical workers and take 1996 as the “base
year” we see that there are statistical significant correlations for all the years back to 1988 except for
1991. On the other hand, using 1991 as the “base year” there is no statistical significant correlation
between the real wage increase residuals in 1990 and 1991, but positive correlation between 1991 and
1989. For both occupations, the overall pattern from Table 5 is a negative correlation between this
years real wage increase residuals and last years residuals and in most cases, there are also statistical
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significant correlations further back in time. But with correlations between t and ti with i > 1 it is
difficult to find any systematic pattern in the sign and statistical significance of the correlations.20 One
possible explanation for negative serial correlation may be institutional settings, in particular collective
wage agreements. It is not uncommon that the agreements favor different groups of workers in
different years. If one group of workers gets a large wage increase this year at the expense of other
workers it is plausible that this group gets less next year. Negative correlation is also found in Gibbs
and Hendricks (2004) for the wage system that roughly “covered white–collar professional or
managerial jobs.” But, as the authors argue “[negative serial correlation] is inconsistent with an
interpretation based on differences in rates of human capital accumulation.”21 Using panel data
techniques, Belzil and Bognanno (2005) find that “current compensation growth is [...] negatively
correlated with past compensation growth.” Dias da Silva and van der Klaauw (2006) and Dohmen
(2004) find positive serial correlation in their studies, while Lluis (2005) find no evidence of serial
correlation. In other words, the empirical evidence is mixed.
Table 5: Serial correlation in residual percentage real wage increases.
Technical white collar workers (N = 3,798)
1997 1996 1995 1994 1993 1992 1991 1990 1989
1996 -.2089***
1995 -.0221 -.0883***
1994 -.0048 .0419*** -.0467***
1993 -.0330** .0330** -.0369** -.0252
1992 .0411** -.0371** -.0079 -.0353** -.1123***
1991 .0027 .0232 -.0448*** -.0577*** .0547*** -.1377***
1990 -.0194 .0320** .0085 .0097 -.0225 .0679*** -.0210
1989 .0628*** .0859*** .0412** -.0027 -.0042 .0101 .0283* .0580***
1988 .0405** -.0600*** -.0072 -.0265 .0271* .0173 -.0107 -.0769*** -.0309*
Administrative white collar workers (N = 4,601)
1997 1996 1995 1994 1993 1992 1991 1990 1989
1996 -.2179***
1995 -.0145 -.1257***
1994 -.0205 -.0108 -.0887***
1993 .0179 -.0050 .0490*** -.1287**
1992 .0297** .0047 -.0241 .0128 -.1085***
1991 .0240 .0274* .0224 -.0257* .0075 -.0516***
1990 -.0239 .0115 .0075 .0348** .0079 .0288* -.0728***
1989 -.0399*** .0465*** .0252* .0338** .0123 .0556*** .0361** .0066
1988 .0335** .0408*** -.0572*** -.0209 -.0265* -.0097 -.0134 -.1273*** -.0802***
***/**/* significant at 1, 5 and 10% significance level. Sample restricted to 3,798 technical and 4,601 administrative workers
followed over 11 years (balanced panel). The controls in the OLS are education, gender, age, hierarchical level, sector and
year dummies. Dependent variable is percentage real wage increase from t – 1 to t.
Are promotions associated with large wage increases? 
Tables 6 and 7 show the wage level and wage change (respectively) and the levels with or without a
move in the hierarchy. The tables show that workers who get promoted earn a higher wage and get a
20Regardless of statistical significance, about 50% of the correlations in the table are negative.
21See Gibbs and Hendricks (2004) for a detailed discussion of sources of serial correlations. One possible
source of negative serial correlation is measurement error. They discuss this case and it is not a plausible
explanation in my case either because of the way the data is collected, cfr. Section 4.
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promotion premium (on average) compared to those who do not move.22 Looking at Table 7 it is clear
that a wage change associated with a promotion is significantly larger that a wage change for a worker
who does not change position. This fact is in line with previous research. If a technical worker at level
4 stays in that level he gets a wage change of NOK 370 but if promoted the wage increase is NOK
1,400. The table also reveals that in most cases demotions are associated with a decrease in (real)
wages.
Table 6: Monthly real wage by level in t1 and level in t. Standard deviation in parenthesis.
Technical white collar workers (N=202,142)
Level
Lag level 1 2 3 4 Total
1 18,316 19,855 23,126 . . 18,483
(2,439) (2,341) (3,449) . . (2,527)
2 19,432 21,415 23,613 28,121 . 21,636
(2,623) (3,045) (3,280) (4,268) . (3,194)
3 21,417 22,562 26,037 29,477 33,727 26,170
(3,231) (3,457) (4,182) (4,056) (5,294) (4,302)
4 . 26,057 28,463 31,346 34,966 31,442
. (4,611 ) (4,608) (4,389) (4,383) (4,530)
5 . . 32,087 33,132 38,475 38,250
. . (5,712) (4,772) (5,855) (5,920)
Total 18,362 21,385 25,937 31,181 38,066 26,381
(2,463) (3,069) (4,210) (4,415) (5,833) (7,145)
Administrative white collar workers (N=227,077)
Level
Lag level 1 2 3 4 5 Total
1 15,543 16,730 18,716 . . 15,707
(2,042) (2,170) (3,015) . . (2,116)
2 15,972 18,121 21,371 24,162 . 18,215
(2,271) (2,454) (3,105) (4,255) . (2,620)
3 16,685 19,017 23,920 29,134 35,330 23,924
(2,581) (2,696) (4,190) (4,819) (8,530) (4,450)
4 . 20,766 25,484 32,057 41,334 31,860
. (3,270) (4,714) (6,166) (7,164) (6,422)
5 . . 25,472 36,248 45,233 44,514
. . (5,169) (6,492) (9,015) (9,193)
Total 15,579 18,084 23,786 31,867 44,741 22,327
(2,066) (2,476) (4,213) (6,159) (8,925) (7,689)
22In the sample there are 13,549 observations of promotions for technical workers and 12,062 for
administrative workers. About 20% (2,627 and 2,690 workers) of these actually receive a real wage decrease
upon promotion. An interesting question is of course why we observe this. One possible (although not verified)
explanation could be a trade-off between status and wages. See e.g. Cardoso (2005) who find suggestive evidence
of such a trade-off using Portuguese data for the years 1991–2000.
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Table 7: Real wage change by level in t1 and t. Standard deviation in parenthesis.
Technical white collar workers (N=202,142)
Level
Lag level 1 2 3 4 5 Total
1 223 868 1,857 . . 289
(878) (1,171) (2,594) . . (968)
2 92 364 1,179 2,702 . 455
(1,029) (1,070) (1,575) (3,231) . (1,193)
3 -70 103 380 1,514 2,768 445
(1,861) (1,285) (1,306) (2,127) (3,855) (1,416)
4 . -632 -10 369 1,408 415
. (2,517) (1,639) (1,513) (2,533) (1,624)
5 . . -734 -337 445 411
. . (3,127) (1,895) (1,814) (1,833)
Total 218 379 426 480 569 414
(889) (1,098) (1,365) (1,655) (1,970) (1,412)
Administrative white collar workers (N=227,077)
Level
Lag level 1 2 3 4 5 Total
1 248 753 1,666 . . 318
(827) (1,205) (2,255) . . (919)
2 200 247 1,309 3,405 . 299
(1,078) (869) (1,862) (3,958) . (992)
3 -578 -9 357 1,821 6,796 408
(1,527) (1,137) (1,244) (2,514) (5,274) (1,371)
4 . -1,655 -66 446 2,687 454
. (4,674) (1,683) (1,654) (4,217) (1,771)
5 . . -4,081 -469 607 516
. . (6,430) (2,925) (2,924) (2,953)
Total 243 262 409 543 872 363
(852) (919) (1,343) (1,805) (3,205) (1,328)
Are wage increases on promotion small relative to the difference between average wages across levels
of the job ladder? 
When looking at this prediction, I apply the methodology used in Gibbs and Hendricks (2004). Let us
define an employee’s location in the wage range within a given level in a given year (location) as the
percentage distance from the lowest observed wage (min) to the highest observed wage (max) in that
level. Formally,
100 [0,100].
wage min
location
max min
-
= Î
-
(9)
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Table 8 shows the effect of a promotion on the location in the wage range.23 The first thing to
notice is that workers who are promoted come from all parts of the wage distribution. But most of
them, roughly 60% and 54%, come from the lower part of the distribution (looking at the column
marked N). The overall evidence from the table is clear: the workers are promoted into a lower location
at their new level than the location they had at the previous level. Administrative workers with a
location parameter below 40 the common pattern is to either stay in the same location range or get into
a higher location range.
The last column of the table shows percentage wage increase upon promotion divided by the
percentage difference in mean wage between the old and the new hierarchical level. Overall, this ratio
is about .20. When a worker is promoted the wage increase associated with a promotion is about 20%
of the difference in the mean wage between the two levels. This supports the evidence on the location
mobility. The general pattern is that the ratio is decreasing with the increase in the location parameter
prior to promotion. For the three highest location parameters the ratio is below .10.
Table 8: Wage range dynamics on promotion.
Technical white collar workers
Old
location
New location
<10 10-20 20-30 30-40 40-50 50-60 60-70 70-80 80-90 90< N
%raise / 
%Δ in 
mean wage
<10 81.3% 18.8 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 16 .24
10-20 17.8 28.9 7.2 34.9 10.0 1.0 .2 .0 .0 .0 499 .48
20-30 9.3 38.2 21.0 17.7 10.2 3.4 .1 .0 .0 .0 1,598 .32
30-40 2.8 24.9 32.2 27.1 11.9 1.0 .2 .0 .0 .0 2,498 .27
40-50 .3 10.0 27.9 31.7 26.9 2.9 .4 .0 .0 .0 3,649 .25
50-60 .2 5.3 18.4 36.0 31.4 8.3 .5 .0 .0 .0 2,996 .20
60-70 .1 5.5 10.9 21.5 38.6 20.7 2.7 .1 .0 .0 1,447 .15
70-80 .0 3.9 6.9 17.3 32.4 27.6 10.4 1.2 .3 .0 595 .06
80-90 .0 2.9 7.2 13.9 10.1 33.7 22.1 8.7 1.0 .5 208 .02
90< .0 .0 2.3 2.3 11.6 23.3 18.6 30.2 9.3 2.3 43 .05
Total 2.5% 14.8 21.8 28.1 23.7 7.2 1.4 .3 .1 .0 13,549 .24
Administrative white collar workers
Old
location
New location
<10 10-20 20-30 30-40 40-50 50-60 60-70 70-80 80-90 90< N
%raise/ 
%Δ in 
mean wage
<10 16.7% 8.3 58.3 8.3 8.3 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 12 .66
10-20 11.8 9.1 19.2 17.9 36.5 5.5 .0 .0 .0 .0 474 .38
20-30 6.5 29.0 32.4 25.0 4.0 3.0 .1 .0 .0 .0 907 .36
30-40 2.0 16.9 25.5 44.4 10.4 .5 .1 .1 .0 .0 2,205 .30
40-50 1.0 8.0 19.7 40.2 28.2 2.8 .1 .0 .0 .0 2,893 .24
50-60 .1 4.8 12.2 40.5 36.3 5.9 .2 .0 .0 .0 2,999 .17
60-70 .1 3.4 4.1 24.3 52.6 14.4 .9 .1 .0 .1 1,723 .12
70-80 .0 5.7 1.5 18.8 30.4 38.9 4.3 .5 .0 .0 655 .08
80-90 .0 2.8 1.4 4.2 21.7 39.2 27.3 3.5 .0 .0 143 .07
90< .0 2.0 7.8 9.8 15.7 13.7 41.2 7.8 2.0 .0 51 -.00
Total 1.6% 9.6 16.4 35.0 28.9 7.4 1.0 .1 .0 .0 12,062 .22
The last column of the table shows percentage wage increase upon promotion divided by the percentage difference in mean
wage between the old and the new hierarchical level.
23Since the location parameter can take on all values between 0 and 100, I have made 10 groups to make
the table manageable.
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Are wage increases a predictor for promotion? 
To see whether or not a wage increase is a predictor for promotion I have run a probit model. The
estimation results are reported in Table 9. For both occupations there is a positive relationship between
percentage real wage change for both one and two lags back in time and the probability of getting a
promotion. The effect for technical workers is larger than for administrative workers for the first lag,
but when looking at the second lag it is the other way around. However, the marginal effects, computed
at the mean, are very small for both occupations. The marginal effects more or less increase relative to
where in the distribution I compute the marginals. An assumed real wage increase of 10% changes the
marginal effects to .0021 (.00009 for the second lag) and .0001 (.0001) for the two occupations. In
other words, even if the numbers increase they are of no practical significance. This implies that the
wage increase is not a good predictor for promotion, at least when looking back one or two time
periods.
Table 9: Results from a probit estimation. Dependent variable is promotion. Marginal effect (at mean)
for % wage change in square brackets. Robust standard error in parenthesis.
Technical Administrative
white collar workers white collar workers
1 lag %wage change .0065*** [.00019] .0059*** [.0001]
(.0013) (.0012)
2 lags %wage change .0029** [.00008] .0045*** [.0001]
(.0012) (.0012)
female .1876*** .4035***
(.0249) (.0162)
age -.0395*** -.0272***
(.0011) (.0009)
edu -.0715*** -.0665***
(.0031) (.0037)
level dummies yes yes
year dummies yes yes
sector dummies yes yes
N 104,035 119,706
Pesudo R2 .1179 .1034
***/**/* significant at 1, 5 and 10% significance level.
Summing up
The descriptive analysis suggests that: (1) Real wage decreases are not rare. Demotions occur less
often, but are not truly rare. (2) There is negative serial correlation in wages after controlling for
observables between the wage increase in this period and the wage increase in the previous time
period. (3) Promotions are associated with large wage increases. (4) Wage increases on promotion are
small relative to the difference between average wages across levels of the job ladder. (5) There is a
positive relationship between lagged wage increases and promotion. But the effect is of no practical
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significance.
The conclusion is that there is support in the data for most of the predictions in the model.
Hence, the data set should be suitable for estimating the GW99 model.
6  Econometric setup
In explaining the econometric setup I draw heavily on Lluis (2005) and Gibbons, Katz, Lemieux, and
Parent (2005).24
The wage equation in the model is given
( ).eijt j j it itw d c f xq= + (10)
Let ijtR  be dummy variables indicating worker i’s rank j at time t. Let itX  be a vector with
observable characteristics of the worker25 and itm  an error term. The equation I will estimate is
1 1 1
( ) .
J J J
e
ijt ijt j ijt it j ijt j it it it
j j j
w R d R X b R c f xq m
= = =
= + + +å å å (11)
As Lluis (2005) points out ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates will be inconsistent. The rank
assignment is endogenous based on eitq , making 
e
itq  correlated with the rank dummies. Further, 
e
itq
introduces another challenge by being interacted with the ijtR  terms and, thus, can not be eliminated by
first differencing the wage equation. Note, however, that fixed-effect models can be applied if one
assumes that (1) the unobserved heterogeneity term is not time varying, and (2) the heterogeneity is
equally valued in the different ranks. This assumption is made throughout the study by Lima and
Pereira (2003).
Quasi-differencing the equation
It is possible to eliminated eitq  from Equation (11) by using a quasi-differencing technique.26 First solve
Equation (11) with respect to eitq
24Gibbons, Katz, Lemieux, and Parent (2005) write on page 684: “Although our empirical work explores
two standard definitions of sectors (i.e., occupations and industries), other definitions are possible. For example,
sectors could be jobs inside a firm [...], states or regions within a country [...], or entire countries [...].”
25Later in the paper I will summarize all the observable characteristics of the worker in a skill index in
order to (significantly) reduce the number of parameters to be estimated (each observable characteristic is
interacted with the hierarchical levels). See Section 6.1.
26This technique is first employed in Holtz-Eakin, Newey, and Rosen (1988) who look at models where
the fixed effect is interacted with year dummies. Lemieux (1998) uses this technique when he estimates a model
where the return to the fixed effect is different in the union and the non-union sectors. Gibbons, Katz, Lemieux,
and Parent (2005) estimate models in which the fixed effect is differently valued in different sectors of the
economy. Finally, Lluis (2005) employs the methodology when she estimates the Gibbons-Waldman model using
German data.
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 Then we use the property that the expected innate ability follows a martingale process.
1 ,
e e
it it ituq q -= + (13)
where itu  is assumed orthogonal to 1
e
itq -  Substituting Equation (12) and its lagged version into
Equation (13) we obtain
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where
1
1 1
1 1
.
( ) ( )
it it
it it J J
ijt j it ijt j it
J J
u
R c f x R c f x
m m
e -
- -
= =
= + -
å å (15)
Equation (14) is the one to be estimated.
In the model without learning it is possible to take the lagged version of Equation (12) and
substitute into Equation (11) since 1
e e
it itq q -= . This implies that itu  drops from Equation (15).
The quasi-differencing corrects the endogeneity in the assignment of workers to the ranks, but
it is not possible to estimate Equation (14) using nonlinear least squares because of further endogeneity
problems (Lluis, 2005). First, 1ijtw -  is correlated with 1itm - . Second, in the model with learning itu , i.e.
the new information in the learning process about innate ability at time t, is correlated with ijtR , since
beliefs about ability influence the current rank assignment. To get consistent estimates one must correct
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for these endogeneity problems by choosing valid instruments for 1ijtw -  and ijtR .
Full information
In the model with full information, the random shock itu  in the learning process drops from the
martingale 1
e e
it it ituq q -= + , and hence, drops from Equation (15). The quasi-differencing method
corrects for the endogeneity in the assignment of workers to job ranks. But since 1ijtw -  is correlated
with 1itm -  we must find a suitable instrument for 1.ijtw -  The instrument must be (highly) correlated
with the wage, but not correlated with the error term. In explaining the choice of instruments it is
helpful to look at Figure 1. Assume two workers A and B with A Hq =  and B Lq =  (H > L) and the
same labor market experience. Their wages are different because A Bq q=/  More specifically At Btw w>
since .A Bq q>  Information on contemporaneous rank assignment is not enough to identify wage
differences. But worker A’s effective ability ( )At A Atf xh q=  may be at the level of effective ability to
get promoted next period. In other words, having information on the worker’s contemporaneous rank
and his rank in the next period gives information about the ability level and, hence, on his wage. In the
model with full information it is possible to use the interaction terms between 1ijtR -  and ijtR  as
instruments.
Symmetric learning
The mobility in the model is driven by the learning process, hence ijtR  is correlated with the new
information .itu  Recall that 1
e e
it it ituq q -= +  This implies that ijtR  must be instrumented in addition to
1ijtw -  Because of the martingale process, 1ijtR -  and 2ijtR -  is not correlated with itu  since current rank is
only affected by .itu  The instrument we are looking for should therefore help identify differences in
ability from one period to the next. As argued in Lluis (2005), the interaction between 1ijtR -  and 2ijtR -
“constitutes a good predictor of current rank affiliation because it helps identify differences in expected
ability in period t1 (using the same argument as in the perfect information case) as well as in period
t.”
Looking at Equation 14, we see that there are interaction terms between the rank indicator and
the skill index and between the rank indicator and the labor market experience. But since ijtR  is
endogenous in the learning case, I instrument this variable with 2ijtR - . In other words, I include the
interaction between the skill index and the levels and the experience and the levels in the instrument
matrix Z.27 Table 10 sums up the discussion of the instruments.
27Note that Lluis (2005) also includes these instruments when estimating the model without learning only
using ijtR  instead of 2.ijtR -  This is not necessary since ijtR  is not endogenous in that case. To be more precise,
the quasi-differencing takes care of the endogeneity problem with the rank assignment in the model without
learning, as explained above.
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Table 10: Variables in the instrument matrix Z. SI is the skill index and E is experience.
Full information Symmetric learning
Endogenous variables
1ijtw - 1ijtw -
ijtR
ijtS R´
ijtE R´
Instrument matrix Z
1ijt ijtRR -´ 1 2ijt ijtR R- -´
2ijtS R -´
2ijtE R -´
To estimate Equation (14) I apply a GMM estimator in which the set of instruments iZ  must
satisfy the usual orthogonality condition
[ ] 0.i iE Ze = (16)
The objective function in the minimization problem is given by
1min ( ) ( ) ( )Z Z Z Zg e g e g
-¢ ¢ ¢W (17)
where  is the parameter vector.28
Lluis (2005) applying the same estimation procedure, imposes the following normalization on
the minimization problem
(18)
where N is the number of individuals, T is the number of time periods (number of observations) for
each individual, and
1 1
1
.
( )
J J
ijt ijt j ijt it j
j je
it J
ijt j it
j
w R d R X b
R c f x
q = =
=
- -
=
å å
å
(19)
28The estimation is carried out in SAS v. 9.1. using the proc model procedure in the SAS/ETS package.
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According to Lluis (2005) this normalization to zero is necessary for the parameters to be identified.29
6.1  From econometric setup to practical implementation
Equation (14), is complex and it is necessary to make several simplifying assumptions to estimate the
model.
Skill index
itX  is a vector with observable characteristics of the worker that is interacted with the hierarchical
levels. To restrict the number of parameters to be estimated, I summarize these observable
characteristics by a skill index. A similar approach is taken in Lluis (2005) and Gibbons, Katz,
Lemieux, and Parent (2005). The skill index is constructed as follows: Log monthly wage is regressed
on years of education, experience and squared experience, marriage, and dummies for year (12),
gender and industries (7). The skill index is then defined as predicted wage in levels based solely on
the coefficients of education and experience.30 Finally, the skill index is normalized with a mean of
zero.
Functional form  for  )( itf x
Lluis (2005) argues that a natural choice for the accumulated labor market function )( itf x  is
2
0 1 2( ) ( ).it it itf x exp x xa a a= + + (20)
In the estimation, however, she ends up replacing this expression with )( 1.itf x =  “For any other
functional forms where f varies with experience, the parameters of the f function could not be
estimated” (p. 753). I experience the same problem, and follow Lluis’ solution. Restricting ( )itf x  to
one implies that we take away the dynamics in the model in the no-learning case. The wage equation
changes from ( )ijt j j i itd c fw xq= +  to ijt j j idw c q= +  and effective ability changes from ( )it i itf xh q=
to .it i ih q h= =  In other words, we assume that the assignment of workers to jobs is based on the
workers innate ability only. Unless the thresholds for a promotion ( jh ) changes, the worker is not
assigned to a new position.
The simplification above has implications for the instrumental matrix. With )( 1itf x =  it is not
necessary to instrument the interaction between )( itf x  and current rank.
7  Results
7.1  Ranks, measured skills and unobserved ability
I start the analysis by presenting some simple regressions. In column 1 of Table 11 I have estimated
monthly wage in NOK 10,000 on the hierarchical levels (no other controls included). The first thing to
notice is that the rank variables explain about 70% of the variation in monthly wage implying that the
rank variable is important in explaining a worker’s wage. This supports the claim that in internal labor
markets wages are strongly attached to the hierarchical levels. All the coefficients are statistically
29She refers the reader to Lemieux (1993, 1998). This normalization is not explicitly discussed in Gibbons,
Katz, Lemieux, and Parent (2005).
30I use wage in levels to get consistency with the GW99 model specification.
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significant at the 1% level. In column 2 I have added the skill variable (see Section 6.1 for the
definition) as a control. Controlling for the workers’ measured skills reduces the impact of the ranks
somewhat, but still the rank dummies are statistically significant and increase with the hierarchical
levels. The size of the skill parameter is about the same as the dummy for the middle rank. In the last
column of the table I have used the fixed effects estimator. This implies that, contrary to the theoretical
model of Gibbons and Waldman (1999b), I assume that the unobserved ability is constant over time
and is rewarded the same in each hierarchical level. The results show that unobserved ability is
important. The size of the rank dummies, however, is significantly smaller than when applying OLS.
Hence, it is important to control for unobserved ability. Also note that when controlling for unobserved
ability, the importance of the observed part of the skills more than doubles.
Table 11: Rank wage differentials.
Specification no. (1) (2) (3)
Technical white collar workers (N=202,142)
Level 2 .302*** .218*** .066***
(.002) (.002) (.003)
Level 3 .757*** .543*** .166***
(.002) (.002) (.004)
Level 4 1.282*** .970*** .332***
(.003) (.003) (.005)
Level 5 1.969*** 1.521*** .563***
(.004) (.005) (.008)
skills .602*** 1.437***
(.003) (.011)
N 202142 202142 202142
R2 .674 .736 .485
Administrative white collar workers (N=227,077)
Level 2 .250*** .185*** .044***
(.001) (.001) (.002)
Level 3 .821*** .663*** .166***
(.002) (.002) (.003)
Level 4 1.629*** 1.341*** .370***
(.003) (.003) (.005)
Level 5 2.916*** 2.477*** .762***
(.012) (.012) (.015)
skills .566*** 1.342***
(.004) (.010)
N 227077 227077 227077
R2 .723 .761 .343
Dependent variable: monthly wage in NOK 10,000. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Base group: level 1. Note that the
within R2 is reported for the fixed effects model, specification (3). ***/**/* significant at 1, 5 and 10% significance level.
7.2  Comparative advantage based on measurable skills only
Comparative advantage implies that skills are rewarded differently along the firm’s job ladder and that
workers are sorted by their skills and ability into a given position in the firm hierarchy. Empirically I
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can test this by first estimating the Gibbons-Waldman model as outlined in Section 6 and then use a
Wald test statistic to test whether the slopes in the model (i.e. the jb ’s and jc ’s coefficients) are
different from one another.
I start by presenting evidence on comparative advantage based on measurable skills (the jb ’s)
only. I do this by estimating a simple OLS model where I have interacted the skill index with the
hierarchical levels. Instead of a Wald test it is now possible to use the standard F test.
Technical white collar workers
Table 12 shows that all the coefficients are statistically significant. The size of the jb  coefficients
increase up to level three and then decrease (inverse U-shape). This means that measured skills, i.e.
education and experience, are most important in level three. But even if the importance of measured
skills are less in the two top levels compared to level three, their estimated coefficients are still larger
than in the two lowest levels. The comparative advantage hypothesis has support since the joint test of
equalities in the slopes and all the pair-wise tests reject the null hypothesis.31
Administrative white collar workers
The results for administrative workers follows the same pattern as for technical workers with the
exception that measured skills increase up to level four and then decline. Further, the size of the
coefficients for the jb ’s are smaller for administrative workers than for technical workers for the three
lowest levels. This means that the return to the skill index is higher for technical than for administrative
workers at the lower ranks, but lower at the top level.
31The 0H  for the joint test is that all of the pair-wise slopes are equal.
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Table 12: Comparative advantage based on measurable skills only.
Level 1 2 3 4 5
Technical white collar workers (N=202,142)
Level dummies d1 d2 d3 d4 d5
. .26*** .59*** 1.03*** 1.62***
. (.003) (.003) (.003) (.007)
Skill measured b1 b2 b3 b4 b5
.37*** .48*** .74*** .63*** .52***
(.006) (.007) (.005) (.006) (.011)
Tests for equality:
bj’s joint b2=b1 b3=b2 b4=b3 b5=b4
F-statistic 611.45 140.82 978.04 179.47 75.55
p-value .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000
Administrative white collar workers (N=227,077)
Level dummies d1 d2 d3 d4 d5
. .23*** .72*** 1.32*** 2.53***
. (.002) (.002) (.004) (.021)
Skill measured b1 b2 b3 b4 b5
.25*** .35*** .61*** .82*** .58***
(.005) (.004) (.006) (.008) (.032)
Tests for equality:
bj’s joint b2=b1 b3=b2 b4=b3 b5=b4
F-statistic 1,200.81 261.32 1,263.41 399.46 53.10
p-value .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000
***/**/* significant at 1, 5 and 10% significance level. Dependent variable is monthly real wage in 1,000. Robust standard
errors in parentheses.
7.3  Comparative advantage based on both measured and unmeasured skills
In addition to measurable skills we now enrich the estimation by also controlling for unmeasured skills,
but no learning (i.e. the full information case in GW99).
Technical white collar workers
The first panel in Table 13 shows the estimation results of the model with comparative advantage using
both measurable (the jb ’s) and unmeasurable skills (the jc ’s), but without learning. First we notice
how well the parameter estimates of the jc ’s fit the theoretical parameter bounds. From Section 3 we
remember that 1 1 0J Jc cc -> > ¼ > >  with J = 5 in our case. All the parameter estimates are statistically
significant with p-values below .0001 except for the parameter 5d  which is not significant (p-value
of .446). Along the career path we see that the unmeasured skills (the jc ’s) increases, suggesting, as
suspected, that the worker’s unmeasured skills become more important as the worker climbs the
hierarchy. One more unit of unmeasured skill at the top level is valued almost four times as much as at
the lowest hierarchical level.
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As already noted in the beginning of this section, the comparative advantage hypothesis
suggests different rewards for skills at different hierarchical levels. The table also shows that all the
formal statistical tests for equality reject the null hypothesis of equality in the slope coefficients. In
other words, we have support for the comparative advantage hypothesis when looking at unmeasured
skills. The same story can be told about measured skills (the jb ’s). Measured skills also become more
important as the worker climbs the job ladder. Compared to the OLS case (Table 12) the size of the
estimated measured skills coefficients is larger and they increase in a monotonic way with the
hierarchical levels.
The largest change in the parameter values for measured skills is from level 4 to level 5. For
unmeasured skills the largest change is between level 3 and 4. These two “kinks” for measurable skills
and unmeasurable skills can be interpreted (in the language of BGH) as critical choke points in the
career path. If a worker wants to climb the corporate ladder he or she must face a higher demand for
both measurable and unmeasurable skills. In other words, the competition for higher jobs increase
along the career path, and the best workers are selected into the highest ranks. Also note that the pure
rank effects (the jd ’s) are all statistically significant and larger than zero. This means that there is some
other mechanism going on in addition to measurable and unmeasurable skills in explaining wage
increases and mobility.
Administrative white collar workers
The estimation results for the no learning case is reported in Table 13. All the estimated coefficients
are statistical significant at the 1%-level except for the parameter 5d  which is significant at the 5%-
level. The coefficients for both measurable and unmeasurable skills increase along the career path. This
means that these skills are becoming more important for the workers’ output as they climb the career
ladder. Compared to the technical white collar worker sample, the size of these coefficients are larger
meaning that the return to both measurable (the jb ’s) and unmeasured (the jc ’s) skills are higher for
administrative workers than for technical workers. All the equality tests reject the null hypothesis and,
hence, stress the importance of comparative advantage in the allocation of workers to the jobs.
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Table 13: Results comparative advantage.
Level 1 2 3 4 5
Technical white collar workers (N=202,142)
Level dummies d1 d2 d3 d4 d5
. .116*** .197*** .203*** .028
. (.011) (.011) (.012) (.037)
Skill unmeasured c1 c2 c3 c4 c5
1 1.374*** 1.779*** 2.977*** 3.732***
. (.064) (.093) (.223) (.344)
Skill measured b1 b2 b3 b4 b5
1.201*** 1.347*** 1.437*** 1.581*** 2.109***
(.026) (.020) (.019) (.036) (.066)
Tests for equality:
cj’s joint c2=c1 c3=c2 c4=c3 c5=c4
χ2 statistic 97.71 34.53 55.64 45.14 12.36
p-value .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001 .0004
bj’s joint b2=b1 b3=b2 b4=b3 b5=b4
χ2 statistic 202.18 22.62 10.85 13.10 49.00
p-value .0001 .0001 .0010 .0003 .0001
Administrative white collar workers (N=227,077)
Level dummies d1 d2 d3 d4 d5
. .122*** .222*** .122*** -.347**
. (.008) (.009) (.016) (.141)
Skill unmeasured c1 c2 c3 c4 c5
1 1.632*** 2.405*** 3.492*** 4.685***
. (.072) (.121) (.234) (.412)
Skill measured b1 b2 b3 b4 b5
1.278*** 1.470*** 2.062*** 2.728*** 3.737***
(.025) (.020) (.033) (.056) (.283)
Tests for equality:
cj’s joint c2=c1 c3=c2 c4=c3 c5=c4
χ2 statistic 154.50 76.25 128.46 43.67 18.60
p-value .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001
bj’s joint b2=b1 b3=b2 b4=b3 b5=b4
χ2 statistic 824.42 37.83 237.31 106.63 12.35
p-value .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001 .0004
***/**/* significant at 1, 5 and 10% significance level. Dependent variable is monthly real wage in 1,000. Standard errors in
parentheses.
7.4  Comparative advantage and learning
Now we deviate from the full information case in GW99 and allow firms to learn about their workers’
ability.
28
Technical white collar workers
Table 14 shows the estimation results. Even if most of the estimated coefficients are statistically
significant they are much less systematic than in the case with comparative advantage only. The
parameters 2 5 2, ,d d c  and 2b  are not statistically significant. The other parameters are significant at the
1% significance level. Ignoring 2c  and 2 ,b  which are not statistically significant, we again see that the
parameters for both measurable and unmeasurable skills increase with the levels. Both the joint tests
for equality in the slopes reject the null hypothesis about equality and, hence, give support to the
comparative advantage and learning case. However, all the individual tests for equality fail to reject the
null when looking at the measurable part of the skills. In other words, there is no support for the
comparative advantage based on measurable skills. For the unmeasurable part of skill, it seems that the
comparative advantage and learning hypothesis get support at the top levels of the hierarchy. This
implies that learning about workers’ unmeasurable skills is important at the top levels, but not at lower
levels.
Administrative white collar workers
The lower part of Table 14 shows the estimates for the model with learning for administrative white
collar workers. All the parameters are statistically significant at the 1%-level which was not the case
for the sample consisting of technical workers. The parameters for measurable and unmeasurable skills
do not increase in the same monotonic way as in the model without learning. Statistically speaking,
both versions of the model fit the administrative worker sample very well. However, the model with
learning does not fit the structure of the model (increasing jb ’s and jc ’s along the hierarchy) as well as
the model without learning.
The joint equality test for both measurable and unmeasurable skills gives support for firms
learning about the workers. The individual tests for measurable skills all reject the null hypothesis
giving support to selection based on comparative advantage and learning. Recall that none of the
individual tests for equality hold for the jb ’s in the technical white collar sample. Two of the four
individual tests for unmeasurable skills reject the null hypothesis about equality in the slope
parameters. This means that we have partial support for the learning model, at least between rank 1 and
2 and between rank 3 and 4.
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Table 14: Results comparative advantage and learning.
Level 1 2 3 4 5
Technical white collar workers (N=202,142)
Level dummies d1 d2 d3 d4 d5
. 1.132 .505*** .520*** -.073
. (1.294) (.064) (.146) .505
Skill unmeasured c1 c2 c3 c4 c5
1 16.203 5.135*** 9.445*** 28.102***
. (28.005) (.997) (2.319) (8.784)
Skill measured b1 b2 b3 b4 b5
.679*** 3.507 1.435*** 1.513*** 1.641***
(.046) (4.530) (.047) (.069) (.141)
Tests for equality:
cj’s joint c2=c1 c3=c2 c4=c3 c5=c4
χ2 statistic 18.85 .29 .16 7.05 6.53
p-value .0008 .5872 .6891 .0079 .0106
bj’s joint b2=b1 b3=b2 b4=b3 b5=b4
χ2 statistic 311.09 .38 .21 .75 .73
p-value .0001 .5357 .6497 .3862 .3941
Administrative white collar workers (N=227,077)
Level dummies d1 d2 d3 d4 d5
. .734*** .579*** .288*** .500***
. (.086) (.018) (.061) (.156)
Skill unmeasured c1 c2 c3 c4 c5
1 14.946*** 10.106*** 24.885*** 24.133***
. (4.028) (1.591) (5.777) (6.070)
Skill measured b1 b2 b3 b4 b5
.548*** 3.658*** 2.070*** 2.749*** 1.571***
(.021) (.665) (.081) (.158) (.366)
Tests for equality:
cj’s joint c2=c1 c3=c2 c4=c3 c5=c4
χ2 statistic 33.42 11.99 2.28 9.84 .04
p-value .0001 .0005 .1313 .0017 .8391
bj’s joint b2=b1 b3=b2 b4=b3 b5=b4
χ2 statistic 639.25 20.99 5.61 12.13 8.71
p-value .0001 .0001 .0178 .0005 .0032
***/**/* significant at 1, 5 and 10% significance level. Dependent variable is monthly real wage in 1,000. Standard errors in
parentheses.
Robustness
To check for robustness in the technical white collar sample I have used two different subsamples. The
first included, in addition to stayers, workers who moved between firms. Overall the previous results
hold. The second sample was restricted to workers under the age of 35. This restriction is based on the
hypothesis that firms learn most about workers early in their careers. In the model without learning,
there were two more parameters not statistically significant compared to the main sample. But overall
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this subsample did not produce any new insight. It was not possible to get convergence in the model
with learning.
I did the same robustness checks for the administrative white collar worker sample with similar
results. In the sample including movers between firms the individual test for 2 3c c=  (p-value =.0936)
in the learning case also rejected the 0.H  This was not the case when looking at only internal mobility.
In other words, there is even more support for learning when including movers between firms. For
young workers (age not greater than 35) the test 4 5c c=  (p-value = .1438) no longer rejected the 0H  in
the full information case. As in the case of young technical workers, it was not possible to get
convergence in the model with learning.
8  Summary and conclusion
In this paper I have used a large data set of white collar workers in Norway during the years 1987–
1997 to study wage and promotion dynamics within firms.
Through a comprehensive descriptive analysis I have shown that (1) Real wage decreases are
not rare. Demotions occur less often, but are not truly rare. (2) There is negative serial correlation in
wages after controlling for observables between the wage increase in this period and the wage increase
in the previous time period. Even if there is statistically significant correlation further back in time, it is
hard to find any systematic pattern. (3) Promotions are associated with large wage increases. (4) Wage
increases on promotion are small relative to the difference between average wages across levels of the
job ladder. (5) Wage increases predict promotion. But the effect is of no practical significance. There is
support in the data for most of the predictions in the GW99 model.
The estimation of the GW99 model showed that selection of workers into a given position
within a firm hierarchy is based on comparative advantage. Both measurable and unmeasurable skills
are important. This holds for both occupations studied. When it comes to firms learning about their
workers, the results are not so clear, although the joint test for equality holds for both occupations. That
is, the comparative advantage hypothesis has support in both occupations when taking learning into
account. For technical white collar workers there seems to be some support for learning about innate
ability explaining mobility at higher ranks. For administrative white collar workers the comparative
advantage hypothesis has full support when looking at measurable skills and partly support when
looking at unmeasurable skills. Compared to Lluis’ work on Germany, it seems that the learning aspect
of the GW99 model has more support in the Norwegian data. This fits Lluis’ argument about
apprenticeships in Germany reducing the importance of learning and the fact that such an
apprenticeship system is not present in my sample.
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